Somebody f****** tell Trump now!
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Soviet League of Nations
NOT even Mr. Molotov, we imagine, expects his historic speech to be taken at face value. The Soviet Foreign Minister might even be irritated if the world were to believe that the decentralization of a mighty nation was being undertaken overnight merely in order to oil its administrative machinery for the future or to pay a political reward to a fighting people.
Both these purposes may well be present, but they hardly rate a measure which by its scope, potentialities, and timing was bound to rock the political world and inspire endless speculation on the eve of the Allied in-vasion. In the first place, the proposed decentraliza-tion would surely not increase Soviet efficiency in the midst of gigantic military operations, and there is prob-ably no intention of effecting the change immediately. In other words, if administrative reform were all that was involved, the announcement would have been held up and not allowed to strain a diplomatic situation al-ready tense. As for the "reward" theory, there are ways in which the Soviet leaders could expand the freedom of their people short of setting up sixteen separate arm ies and sixteen foreign ministries, complete with dip
lomats. The average Azerbaijanian or Uzbek might, for example, prefer some of the more personal free-doms mentioned in the Soviet constitution but held in trust pending his coming of age.
Molotov himself emphasized the "international sig nificance of the move, which he described as being "of great importance from the viewpoint of all pro-gressive humanity." Its great importance can hardly be denied, but we find it difficult to accept Molo-tov's assurance that it "will constitute a new moral and political blow at fascism." On the contrary, like other recent Soviet diplomatic maneuvers, it is more likely to raise questions concerning Russian intentions than to bridge the ancient gaps between the Soviets and their Western allies.
We do not take seriously the theory that the move is designed to give the Soviet Union sixteen votes at the peace table or in some future association of nations. Power politics rests on power more than on politics, and this kind of arithmetical juggling would be both unnecessary and childish. There are several ways, how-ever, in which the new formula might well enhance the Soviet's international position and profoundly affect the nature of the peace.
Most obvious and not least important, the establishment of sixteen separate foreign offices will give the Soviets a flexibility which may prove highly convenient, ena bling the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, for ex ample, to make a treaty with Turkey for which the
The Nation Feb 12.1944 р. 176, 177
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Russian Soviet Socialist Republic might take no respon sibility. more fundamentally and perhaps this is the real inspiration of the arrangement-the formula would seem designed to remove from the realm of interna tional discussion the issue of the Baltic states, Karelia, and Moilavia, an issue between Russia and the Anglo-American powers which is almost as thorny as the Polish question. Should the Washington and London govern ments choose to discuss the independence of, say Estonia, Mr. Molotov can politely refer them to the Foreign Minister of the autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Estonia, who will doubtless inform the Western governments that his state is already independent and sovereign, that it has its own army, and that it is even willing to exchange diplomats; that, in short, the West-en powers need have no further concern about Eston-ian independence.
There is a good possibility that the Western powers may even welcome this trick solution of a problem which they are powerless to solve any other way. The dangerous aspect of the development is that what a Russian-controlled Estonian government can do, a Communist-dominated Yugoslavia of the future might also do, or a Communist-dominated Bulgaria, Hungary, Greece, or Rumania. In short, the way has been pryned for a Soviet League of Nations which would require
no strong-arm methods of acquisition on the part of the Russians. In this way a powerful Russian sphere of influence could be established in Eastern Europe at the expense of a broader international organization in which spheres of influence would disappear. It is entirely possible that no such development will
occur. But as long as it may occur, the Russians will hold one more trump card in a hand already rich with trumps. We do not believe that the Soviets are commit-ted to such a course, but rather that they are pre-paring themselves, and magnificently, for any and every exigency. This approach is characteristic of Soviet diplo-macy in the past three years. The German Committee in Moscow was another such trump held in reserve. When it became apparent that the Allies meant business about a second front, the card was not played. Un-fortunately, each time one of the great powers seeks security reinsurance against a failure of the United Na-tions Mutual Protection Association, the others feel ob-liged to take out new policies also. Thus the Soviet Sixteen may be regarded as a reply to moves for an extension of the British sphere of influence forecast in the recent speech of General Smuts. These in turn find inspiration in the new nationalism prevalent in this country and in expansionist tendencies in Moscow. It
is clear that the approach to an international organiza tion by way of a "nuclear alliance" of the great powers cannot hope to make headway as long as it is sccom-panied by simultaneous drives toward the acquisition of spheres of influence. No wonder the small states are be wildered, when at one and the same time they are being invited to adhere to a universal security plan and to enter one or another planetary power group.
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This is a clipping from page Daily worker for of the
Clipped at the Seat of Government.
How Fast Can Russia Rebuild?
By EDGAR SNOW
Can the Roda really regain peak production in five years? Will Usey be a big market for 0.5.dat A Post editor tells what he saw and heard abroad.
A
Saturday Evening Post. Feb. 12, 1994.
Papile in one of
Birds of snow(y) white(te)